By Denise Chicoine
In Bodge et al. v. Commonwealth et al. the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the Massachusetts Paid Family Medical Leave Act does not require an employer to guarantee the accrual of vacation and sick time during an employee’s leave.
Law
Since 2019, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 175M, the Paid Family and Medical Leave Act (PFMLA), has enabled eligible employees to take paid leave to, among other things, bond with their child during the first year after the child’s birth, adoption, or placement in foster care.
Section 2 (e) of the PFMLA guarantees that “[a]n employee who has taken family or medical leave shall be restored to the employee’s previous position or to an equivalent position, with the same status, pay, employment benefits, length-of-service credit and seniority as of the date of leave.” Simply put, when an employee returns from PFMLA leave, he or she is to be put back in the same (or equivalent) position as when he or she left, with no loss of accrued length-of-service credit and vacation and sick time.
Section 2(f) of the PFMLA states: “The taking of family or medical leave shall not affect an employee’s right to accrue vacation time, sick leave, bonuses, advancement, seniority, length-of-service credit or other employment benefits, plans or programs. During the duration of an employee’s family or medical leave, the employer shall provide for, contribute to or otherwise maintain the employee’s employment-related health insurance benefits, if any, at the level and under the conditions coverage would have been provided if the employee had continued working continuously for the duration of such leave.”
Facts
The plaintiffs, all State troopers, brought suit against the Commonwealth and the heads of the State Police and the State Board of Retirement, claiming that the defendants’ policy of denying the accrual of benefits, including seniority, length-of-service credit, and vacation and sick time while on PFMLA leave, was a violation of the statute. Each of the plaintiffs sought to take leave in connection with the birth of a child. The defendants informed the plaintiffs that if they took leave under the PFMLA, they would not accrue vacation and sick time, or length-of-service credit while on leave. As a result of these policies, a number of plaintiffs took advantage of other leave options instead, or decided not to take leave at all.
The Superior Court allowed the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the statute does not guarantee the accrual of benefits during PFMLA leave. However, the judge stayed the proceedings and allowed the plaintiffs’ motion to report the order to the Appeals Court seeking clarification on the interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the matter to its docket sua sponte.
Supreme Judicial Court
The Supreme Judicial Court stated that the first sentence of Section 2(f) of PFMLA does not confer accrual rights. “Instead, it ensures that any such rights that the employee already has are ‘not affect[ed]’ while the employee is on leave. Had the Legislature intended for employees to continue to accrue seniority, length-of-service credit, and sick and vacation time during their leave, it specifically would have provided for it.” The Court noted that the second sentence of § 2 (f) specifies that employees do continue to benefit from health insurance during PFMLA leave, thereby drawing a distinction between health insurance benefits and all other benefits.
The Court then ruled that Section 2 (e) makes clear that the level of benefits remains unchanged during PFMLA leave. That is, an employee returning from leave receives no less (and no more) of each enumerated benefit than what he or she had at the start of the leave. The temporary pausing of benefit accrual during leave is neither a “negative change” in an employee’s benefits nor a retaliatory action.
Accordingly, the Court held: “Our reading of the PFMLA does not prevent employers from offering the accrual of benefits during leave; we simply conclude that they are not required to do so under the act.”
