The Wagner Law Group 2026-06-18T16:04:25Z https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/feed/atom/ WordPress /wp-content/uploads/sites/1101401/2021/06/cropped-wagner-fav-icon-2-32x32.png by The Wagner Law Group https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=67659 2025-12-18T17:34:27Z 2025-12-18T17:27:14Z

Alternative Investments in 401(k) Plans: Executive Order Implications and Key Fiduciary Considerations - Stephen Wilkes, John Sohn and Camille Castro, The Wagner Law Group White Paper, December 18, 2025 ]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=62947 2024-05-16T11:25:03Z 2023-11-02T13:12:47Z

By Michael Schloss, Andrew Oringer, Barry Salkin, John Sohn and Stephen Wilkes Earlier this week, on October 31, 2023, the Department of Labor (the “Department”) rolled out its long anticipated new regulation defining who is a fiduciary who provides investment advice for a fee or other compensation under section 3(21)(A)(ii) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).  Concerned that the existing definition of an investment advice fiduciary from 1975 - a time before the advent of 401(k) plans when nobody had even heard of the term “IRA rollover” – no longer adequately protects retirement investors, the Obama administration in 2016 attempted a complete overhaul of the then forty-year-old rule.  This overhaul was itself a reboot of an earlier attempt by the Department to revise the definition of “investment advice” in 2010 – its proposed regulation was severely criticized and withdrawn. In 2018, after a series of lawsuits, the Obama proposal was vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a decision that was not appealed by the Trump Administration, returning the law to the 1975 definition.  The Department then proceeded to reinterpret the 1975 rule so as to attempt to expand ERISA’s reach, but has been rebuffed by a number of courts.  The Wagner Law Group has discussed certain recent adverse judicial activity in a recent law alert (available by clicking here) which is an alert that generally was drafted to address certain of these judicial developments and anticipated future challenges.  The new proposal may well face a similar slew of objections as those that confronted the 2016 proposal (and the later reinterpretation of the 1975 rule) from industry participants satisfied with the existing definition. According to the Department’s Fact Sheet issued along with the proposal, the newest version of the regulation would perform as follows:[1] The Department is proposing that a financial services provider would be an investment advice fiduciary under federal pension law if:

• the provider provides investment advice or makes an investment recommendation to a retirement investor,
• the advice or recommendation is provided for a fee or other compensation, and
• the financial services provider makes the recommendation in the context of a professional relationship in which an investor would reasonably expect to receive sound investment recommendations that are in [the investor's] best interest[, to wit where]:
  • the provider has discretion over investment decisions for the retirement investor;
  • The provider makes investment recommendations to investors on a regular basis as part of their business, and the recommendation is provided under circumstances indicating that the recommendation is based on the particular needs or individual circumstances of the retirement investor and may be relied upon by the retirement investor as a basis for investment decisions that are in the retirement investor's best interest; or
  • the provider states that they are acting as a fiduciary when making investment recommendations.

In addition to proposing changes in the regulation, the Department is proposing to rework two exemptions available for the management of conflicts of interest with respect to advice as well as to make conforming edits to other exemptions.  One exemption (Prohibited Transaction Class Exemption (“PTE”) 2020-02) has been broadly available for advice with respect to the wide universe of investments recommended to retirement investors. A second exemption (PTE 84-24) is tailored for use by independent insurance agents (who, the Department notes repeatedly are not subject to the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest). At first blush, the Department’s proposal attempts to be grounded in the same five-part test it promulgated in 1975 that defined an investment-advice fiduciary.[2]  Even so, the new rule, appears to make significant changes to the test including: (i) tying the “regular basis” prong to the business of the advisor and not the relationship between the advisor and the advisee; (ii) doing away with the “mutual agreement” requirement and, (iii) adding a requirement that the advisee understands that the advice is being provided in their “best interest”.  Whether these changes are consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s 2018 ruling striking down the Department’s prior attempt to redefine an investment advice fiduciary remains to be seen.[3] As proposed, the new rule is designed to encompass recommendations that federal securities laws do not currently cover such as recommendations to purchase non-securities such as real estate, certain kinds of annuities, or commodities like gold.  In addition, those rules also do not cover advice as to which investments should be included in a 401(k) menu.  The Department’s proposal is designed to cover these recommendations as well.  Both the Department and the White House appear to be specifically focused on “fixed index annuities” as an area of particular concern.[4] Along with the new regulation, the Department is also proposing amendments to a number of existing PTEs.  In particular, the Department proposes to amend: PTE 2020-02:[5]  According to the Department, the proposed amendments do not do away with any of the existing “core protections” already contained in PTE 2020-02.  Rather, the amendments add additional disclosure requirements.  The proposal also includes guidance for Financial Institutions and Investment Professionals complying with the Impartial Conduct Standards and implementing their policies and procedures.  Importantly, the amendments do not require a contract for investment advice to IRAs (a requirement contained in the Department’s 2016 regulation).  Nor do the amendments create any new causes of action or require a Financial Institution to provide enforceable warranties to Retirement Investors.  Transactions that fail to satisfy the exemption, however, will be considered prohibited transactions and subject to excise tax under IRC § 4975. Amends PTE 84-24:[6]  The proposed amendments add a new section providing exemptive relief to fiduciaries who are Independent Producers who recommend non-securities annuities or other insurance products from an unaffiliated Insurer to Retirement Investors on a commission or fee basis if certain protective conditions are met.  The proposed amendment would exclude investment advice fiduciaries from the current relief in PTE 84-24 while proposing relief under a new section of the exemption with specific conditions for independent insurance agents providing investment advice. PTE 84-24, as amended, would provide relief only to Independent Producers who sell annuities of two or more unrelated Insurers. Independent Producers who sell or recommend investment products other than annuities, such as mutual funds, stocks and bonds, and certificates of deposit will be required to rely on PTE 2020-02 when receiving fees or other compensation in connection with investment recommendations related to those products. The amended PTE 84-24 would provide relief from the prohibited transaction rules only for the receipt of fully disclosed commissions or fees in connection with annuity recommendations or other insurance. According to the Department, the conditions of PTE 84-24 are similar to the conditions contained in PTE 2020-02 but are tailored to protect Retirement Investors from the specific conflicts that can arise for Independent Producers who are compensated through commissions when providing investment advice to Retirement Investors regarding the purchase of an annuity. The Department also is proposing to add a new eligibility provision in Section VIII for investment advice transactions and amend the current recordkeeping condition in Section V(e) with a new recordkeeping provision in Section IX that is similar to the recordkeeping provision in PTE 2020-02. Although the Department is proposing a pathway for insurance companies to oversee the conduct of Independent Producers under the proposed amendment to PTE 84- 24 without assuming fiduciary status, the Department notes that it remains concerned that, without fiduciary status, insurance companies may not take their supervisory obligations as seriously as they should. According to the Department, for that reason, the proposed amendment does not provide relief for the Insurer, and it strictly limits the scope of relief to the Independent Producer’s receipt of fully disclosed commissions. An Insurer must rely on PTE 2020-02 for relief if it is itself an investment advice fiduciary because it provides investment advice within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) and section 4975(e)(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”) and the regulations issued thereunder. In addition, the Department is proposing that an Insurer’s systematic failures to comply with the proposed exemption’s conditions could result in an Independent Producer’s inability to rely on the amended exemption for relief with respect to recommendations of that Insurer’s products. In such a situation, the Independent Producer would still be able to receive compensation in connection with fiduciary investment advice related to the products of other Insurers, as long as those other Insurers complied with all conditions of amended PTE 84-24 PTEs 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-1, and 86-128:[7]  According to the Department, the proposed amendments to these exemptions would remove fiduciary investment advice as defined in the proposed regulation, from the covered transactions in each exemption and make certain other administrative changes.  The purpose of these amendments appears to be to foreclose alternatives to compliance and otherwise coordinate with newly amended PTE 2020-02.  Among other changes, PTEs 75-1 Parts III & IV, 77-4, 80-83, 83-1, and 86-128 are being amended to include the following statement: “Exception.  No relief from the restrictions of ERISA section 406(b) and the taxes imposed by Code section 4975(a) and (b) by reason of Code sections 4975(c)(1)(E) and (F) is available for fiduciaries providing investment advice within the meaning of ERISA section 3(21)(A)(ii) or Code section 4975(e)(3)(B) and regulations thereunder.” Once the proposal is published in the Federal Register, a 60-day period will commence for public comments with regard to the proposed regulation as well as with regard to the proposed amendments to each of the prohibited transaction exemptions.  In addition, the proposal notes that the Department anticipates holding public hearings approximately 45 days from the date its proposals make it into the Federal Register. It should be noted that the proposed regulation and amendments to the class exemptions are just that – proposed.  In the coming months we should expect robust debate and discussion within the retirement industry and significant levels of substantive comments submitted to the Department.  Some commenters will be supportive, and others will not.  The road to a final version (without counting the impact of litigation which may be filed) will likely take some time. But now, the Department has shown its hand on various issues and started the ball rolling.  The retirement industry can think about “what if” the Department’s positions become permanent, how are they likely to be amended (if at all) before they are finalized and how the Department’s proposal impacts each industry participant’s particular service and/or product platform. ______________________________________________________________________________ [1] Fact Sheet: Retirement Security Proposed Rule and Proposed Amendments to Class Prohibited Transaction Exemptions for Investment Advice Fiduciaries | U.S. Department of Labor (dol.gov) [2] See 29 CFR 2510.3–21(c)(1).  The 1975 rule included a “five part test” an investment advice fiduciary that generally encompassed those who: “(1) Render advice…or make recommendations as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property; (2) On a regular basis; (3) Pursuant to a mutual agreement . . . with the plan or a plan fiduciary; (4) Serve[s] as a primary basis for investment decisions with respect to plan assets; and (5) advice is individualized . . . based on the particular needs of the plan.” [3] Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018). [4] See The Retirement Security Rule - Strengthening Protections for Americans Saving for Retirement | CEA | The White House stating that, with regard to fixed index annuities, “the amount lost to conflicted investment advice could be as high as $5 billion annually.” [5] Proposed Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2020-02 (dol.gov) [6] Proposed Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemption 84-24 (dol.gov) [7] Proposed Amendment to Prohibited Transaction Exemptions 75-1, 77-4, 80-83, 83-1, and 86-128 (dol.gov)]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=61969 2023-05-23T17:01:44Z 2023-05-23T17:01:44Z

The Who, When and Why of Independent Fiduciaries - John Sohn and Stephen Wilkes, Benefits Magazine, May/June 2023]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=60841 2023-04-04T13:45:50Z 2023-04-03T13:41:44Z

Nestimate Debuts Software Solution for In-Plan Guaranteed Income Products - Marcia Wagner and John Sohn, 401(k) Specialist, April 3, 2023 (PDF)]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=59908 2023-01-06T17:14:23Z 2022-12-30T15:43:56Z

Investment Duties Regulation Originally promulgated in 1979, the Investment Duties Regulation, 29 C.F.R. §2550.404a-1, explains how fiduciaries can exercise their fiduciary duties in evaluating and selecting ERISA plan investments. The DOL had supplemented the regulatory standard with informal guidance over the years, but had not amended it until 2021. The Investment Duties Regulation has been a major topic of discussion since June 2020 when the DOL proposed revising it in a way that would effectively chill fiduciary consideration of ESG factors in making investment decisions, and would make it nearly impossible for fiduciaries to consider an investment’s collateral benefits, among other things. While the revised regulation, effective in January 2021, did not mention ESG factors, it retained restrictions on considering collateral benefits, set limitations on selecting qualified default investment alternatives, and channeled the anti-ESG sentiment of the proposed regulation. With the change in Administrations, the DOL issued a nonenforcement policy on March 10, 2021, a new proposed regulation on October 14, 2021, and the new final regulation on November 22, 2022. The revised Investment Duties Regulation provides guidance on complying with the fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty in reviewing and selecting investments. While these duties overlap, they are inherently different. The duty of prudence is rooted in process; fiduciaries are expected to prudently consider relevant facts and circumstances and to act accordingly, documenting their decisions. The duty of loyalty is rooted in fidelity; fiduciaries are expected to act with “an eye single” to the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. The revised Investment Duties Regulation presents guidance on each duty separately and in different forms. Fiduciary Duty of Prudence Subsection (b)(1) of the Regulation continues to provide that fiduciaries will satisfy the fiduciary duty of prudence if they give “appropriate consideration” to relevant facts and circumstances and act accordingly. The final rule maintains the structure of the original 1979 regulation, providing a nonexclusive list of factors that fiduciaries must consider, to demonstrate “appropriate consideration” of relevant facts and circumstances. The final rule modernizes the list in subsection (b)(2) so that fiduciaries must now compare investment options with “reasonably available alternatives with similar risks,” a process that became the industry standard in the years since the original regulation.  The final rule also clarifies how this standard applies to fiduciaries selecting investment menu alternatives for participant-directed individual account plans, which now outnumber defined benefit plans that have their own investment portfolios. The final rule retains certain standards from the original, explaining that fiduciaries must determine that an investment is reasonably designed to further plan purposes. In the case of plans other than participant-directed individual account plans, fiduciaries must consider a plan portfolio’s diversification, liquidity, cash flow, current return, and projected return. In a new subsection (b)(4), the final rule specifies that fiduciaries must evaluate potential investments using a risk/return analysis based on relevant economic factors, using appropriate investment horizons consistent with a plan’s objectives, and considering a plan’s funding policy. Relevant risk/return factors “may include the economic effects of climate change and other environmental, social, or governance factors.” The final rule recognizes that whether any particular consideration is relevant to a risk/return analysis depends on the facts and circumstances, and that deciding how much weight to give to any factor should be based on a reasonable assessment of the factor’s impact on the risk/return analysis. While public discussion has focused on the impact of the new rule on fiduciary consideration of ESG factors, this is the only mention of ESG in the text of the final rule. That ESG factors are briefly mentioned is noteworthy, given that the 2020 proposed revision would have discouraged consideration of ESG factors, and the 2021 proposed rule would have included examples of potential economic impact of ESG factors.  Another notable change is that the final version states that risk/return factors “may include” consideration of ESG factors rather than the proposed rule’s “may often require” such consideration; this change in phraseology underscores that ESG considerations may or may not be relevant economic factors depending on the context. As the DOL explained in the preamble, the final rule clarifies that fiduciaries may consider any factors that they determine have economic impact, which could include ESG factors, without putting a “thumb on the scale” for or against any specific economic factors and without telling fiduciaries how to evaluate economic impact. Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty In contrast, subsection (c) of the final rule provides guidance on the duty of loyalty in the form of a familiar prohibition with newly articulated exceptions. The revised regulation first explains that fiduciaries making investment decisions may not subordinate plan interests to other objectives, sacrifice investment return, or take on additional investment risk to promote unrelated goals or objectives. In other words, the duty of loyalty requires that plan financial interests be first and foremost, and thus fiduciaries may not place other interests ahead of a plan’s financial interests. The revised regulation also reformulated a “tiebreaker” rule, that fiduciaries are not prohibited from selecting investments based on potential collateral benefits when choosing between competing investments that would “equally serve” a plan’s financial goals. Finally, the revised regulation newly clarifies that fiduciaries of participant-directed individual account plans do not violate the duty of loyalty solely because they consider participants’ preferences in evaluating and selecting investment menu options. The original Investment Duties Regulation did not address the duty of loyalty, and the January 2021 version of the rule would have created new requirements. The now replaced 2021 language had expanded the rule that fiduciaries treat a plan’s financial interests as paramount to mean that fiduciaries could only make investment decisions based on “pecuniary” factors, which would have made it difficult for fiduciaries to consider all relevant facts and circumstances. Similarly, the prior version of the tiebreaker rule had imposed recordkeeping and substantive limitations that made it nearly impossible for fiduciaries to be able to consider collateral benefits regardless of context. The revised final regulation gives fiduciaries more room to exercise their fiduciary duties in evaluating and selecting investments, considering all relevant facts and circumstances. Proxy Voting and Exercise of Shareholder Rights The revised Investment Duties Regulation added another new section addressing the exercise of shareholder rights. Like the recent history of regulatory guidance on the duties of prudence and loyalty, a final rule on proxy voting and shareholder rights had gone into effect in January 2021, and was also subject to the nonenforcement policy instituted in March 2021. ERISA fiduciaries are generally allowed under applicable trust agreements to invest plan assets in shares of stock; a plan thus becomes a shareholder with the same shareholder rights as any other investor. Shares held by an ERISA plan, however, are plan assets held in trust. Thus, as explained in subsection (d) of the final rule, fiduciaries must carry out their duties of prudence and loyalty in deciding whether and when to exercise shareholder rights, including voting proxies, on behalf of a plan in its shareholder capacity. The final rule echoes and applies the same principles for evaluating and selecting investments to fiduciary decisions on whether to exercise shareholder rights, explaining that fiduciaries must focus on a plan’s economic interests, which may not be subordinated to unrelated objectives, and consider the overall facts and circumstances, including any related costs. The final rule explains that fiduciaries must act prudently in (i) selecting and monitoring persons to exercise or advise on exercising shareholder rights; (ii) that fiduciaries may not follow the recommendations of a proxy advisory firm without determining that its proxy voting guidelines are consistent with their fiduciary obligations; and (iii) that any plan proxy voting policy must be prudently designed to serve plan interests, be periodically reviewed, and allow fiduciaries to decide whether to vote proxies based on whether the outcome is expected to affect the value of the investment. The final rule also recognizes that delegating authority to an investment manager to manage plan assets typically includes the authority to exercise shareholder rights. It further explains that compliance with the duty to follow governing documents requires that investment managers of pooled investment vehicles holding assets of more than one employee benefit plan attempt to reconcile differences in the various plans’ investment policy statements and also vote proxies of the various plans in accordance with their respective proxy voting policies in proportion to each plan’s economic interests in the pooled vehicle. In the alternative, the investment manager may develop an investment policy statement and proxy voting policy for the vehicle and require investing plans to adopt them as a condition of investing. In such cases, the fiduciaries for each plan must assess whether the investment manager’s investment policy statement and proxy voting policy for the vehicle are consistent with plan objectives before deciding to invest in such vehicle. The provisions on proxy advisory firms and pooled investment vehicles take effect on December 1, 2023. The DOL notes that this will allow time for transition, as commenters had requested. Effects of the Rule The extended debate over whether and how to revise the Investment Duties Regulation has spotlighted the growing global trend of considering climate change and ESG factors in evaluating investment opportunities. Now that the final rule clarifies that such consideration may be appropriate under relevant circumstances, the focus shifts to how this guidance might affect decision making going forward. The DOL’s Regulatory Impact Analysis provides statistics and information that could be of interest to plan fiduciaries, legal counsel, policy groups, and service providers, including investment managers and proxy advisory services. The DOL estimates that approximately 149,000 defined benefit and defined contribution plans covering more than 28,000 participants may be affected by the final rule’s acknowledgment that plan fiduciaries may consider climate change and ESG factors in evaluating investment options.  Among other things, these estimates reflect that ESG investing is more prevalent in large plans and that not all individual account plans offer investment options that implicate ESG factors, though these are rapidly changing trends. The DOL recognizes that determining the financial materiality of climate change and ESG factors can be challenging, noting that there is no standardized or generally accepted definition of ESG factors, and drawing no conclusions on the relationship of ESG factors to investment performance or overall return. For example, the DOL’s literature review notes that some studies find that fees for ESG funds are higher than for other funds, though one study found no statistically significant difference when controlling for active management and assets under management. The DOL’s analysis recognizes that financial industry trends are developing and that the industry has not yet reached consensus on standards or measures for evaluating climate change and ESG factors. The fact that it is hard to evaluate these factors, however, does not preclude, require or, for that matter, permit avoidance of the analysis. Going forward, ERISA plan fiduciaries can consider information on climate change and ESG factors as it is available at the time they are evaluating investments, consistent with their fiduciary duty of prudence. The DOL’s Regulatory Impact Analysis also considers the effect of new guidance on the fiduciary duty of loyalty, including the nod to fiduciary consideration of participant investment preferences. Of particular interest, the DOL notes that there may be significant demand for ESG alternatives among participants in self-directed defined contribution plans. For instance, a survey by a financial institution found that 69% of participants ages 45–75 would increase their contribution rate if an ESG option were offered. The DOL recognizes that appealing to investor preference can help promote the policy goal of increasing retirement savings. The revised tiebreaker rule may also have an impact on fiduciary evaluation of investment opportunities that could provide collateral benefits beyond investment performance. For example, in the regulatory preamble the DOL confirmed that an investment that “stimulates or maintains employment that, in turn, results in continued or increased contributions to a multiemployer plan” is a permissible example of a collateral benefit that fiduciaries could use in breaking a tie between investments that would equally serve a plan’s financial interests. Fiduciaries might also consider climate change and ESG factors in a similar vein, or any other potential collateral benefit, as long as they maintain their primary focus on a plan’s financial interests. Moreover, the DOL estimates that some 63,000 plans that hold stock directly or indirectly, including ESOPs and some welfare plans, may be affected by the proxy voting and shareholder rights provisions, including small plans that do not report their holdings as part of their Form 5500. The DOL estimates that these plans employ more than 17,000 service providers whose services may relate to shareholder rights, including trustees, trust companies, banks, investment advisors, investment managers, and proxy advisory firms. Among the transition and compliance costs, the DOL discusses legal review, updating proxy voting policies, and shifts from non-ESG to ESG investments. The DOL’s economic and statistical analyses should help the agency in defending the rule against legal challenges.  Some commenters suggested, for instance, that climate and ESG issues are reserved to Congress under the Supreme Court’s “major questions” doctrine. The DOL notes that it has express rulemaking authority under Title I of ERISA to provide guidance for fiduciaries in exercising their responsibilities, and that the new final rule was promulgated under that authority. Final Thoughts for Plan Fiduciaries

• Principles-Based: While there is general agreement that the final rule provides helpful clarifications, it embodies a neutral policy that allows for a principles-based approach to ESG investing without being overly prescriptive. Unlike the predecessor rule, the final rule says ESG may be one of many factors that may be considered for investment decision making if it is relevant to the investment decision. Conversely, if ESG is not relevant to an investment decision, it should not be considered. This will enable fiduciaries to take a more facts-and-circumstances approach to the ESG question.

• Participant Choice: For the first time, fiduciaries may consider participant choice, and that will not be considered a violation of the duty of loyalty—provided that all the elements of the final rule are satisfied. Honoring participant choice is likely to increase plan participation. However, the rule does not address how to resolve competing or inconsistent participant choices. And what if the participant choice is not a prudent one? In that case, participant choice cannot prevail.

• Proxy Voting: The final rule makes clear, in contrast to the predecessor rule, that proxy voting and exercise of shareholder rights and privileges is a fiduciary function, which should be exercised in the absence of a reason not to do so.

• Tiebreaker: The final rule allows for collateral benefits to be considered, provided that competing investment otherwise equally serve the interests of the plan. This is more realistic than the predecessor rule, which called for the competing investments to be indistinguishable.

Verification/Confirmation: In connection with investment decisions, ERISA fiduciaries may (and should) request information and/or confirmations from investment managers regarding the role of ESG factors in the relevant investment objectives. This will document that they engaged in a prudent, diligence process in compliance with the final rule. Please contact Stephen Wilkes at swilkes@wagnerlawgroup.com, Israel Goldowitz at Igoldowitz@wagnerlawgroup.com, or John Sohn at jsohn@wagnerlawgroup.com with any questions. PDF VERSION AVAILABLE HERE]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=55825 2022-07-05T13:13:44Z 2022-07-01T15:49:56Z

Cryptocurrency Trading Risks and Risk Mitigation Strategies for ERISA Plan Investors - Marcia S. Wagner, Mark Greenstein and John Sohn, Bloomberg Law Compensation Planning Journal, July 1, 2022 (PDF)]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=56090 2022-07-06T13:58:28Z 2022-05-06T13:55:33Z

Retirement Industry People Moves – John Sohn, PLANSPONSOR, May 6, 2022 (PDF)]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=55492 2022-05-13T13:02:11Z 2022-05-03T12:59:38Z

Wagner Law Lures ERISA Expert Back From BNY Mellon – John Sohn, Law360 May 3, 2022 (PDF)]]> by WLG https://www.wagnerlawgroup.com/?p=56033 2022-07-06T14:18:38Z 2022-05-02T13:16:24Z

Attorney John Sohn Returns to The Wagner Law Group - May 2, 2022 Law News Torday; Finance Industry Today; Massachusetts Business Journal; BenefitsLink]]>